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Abstract
This work analyzes the impact of asymmetric financial constraints on the platforms of
parties, using a formal model of elections. The main results show that when a party faces
a tight financial constraint, the platform chosen in equilibrium is further away from its
ideal point compared with the case when campaign expenses are unlimited. Moreover, we
show that in the presence of asymmetric budget constraints, a financially advantaged party
converges to the median voter and a disadvantaged one diverges away. The strength of the
latter effect depends on the salience of the policy issue in question. The results are tested
by using a dataset of party positions and salience and confirm the theoretical predictions.
Keywords: campaign finance, polarization, endogenous valence, public funding, salience
JEL Codes: D72, D78
I. INTRODUCTION
This study examines the interrelation between the financial constraints and platforms cho-
sen by the parties competing in a two-party system. When voters vote for either of two
candidates, they not only look at the platforms offered, but are also subject to campaign
activities, which might increase the chance of voting for any party irrespective of the chosen
platforms. Therefore, the parties face a tradeoff between choosing a platform appealing
to the median voter and spending resources on campaign activities. When financial con-
straints are placed on the parties, this tradeoff will result in a different choice of platforms
compared with the case when the parties are unconstrained financially.
The most natural institutional setting in which parties face financial constraints is
associated with public funding. According to Austin and Tjernstro¨m (2003), of their 111
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analyzed countries, the public funding of parties is present in 65 countries. In only 12 of
them is public funding equally distributed, whereas in other cases it is related to current
(19 countries) or previous (25 countries) electoral success or current representation in the
legislature (25 countries). Therefore, in the majority of countries that actually finance
parties from their budget, the amount of money at the disposal of the parties is somehow
related to past electoral performance. In this institutional environment, the natural result
is that parties with past electoral success have access to a higher amount of financing than
others. At the same time, in countries in which public financing occurs, parties access to
other types of financing is typically constrained and therefore the share of private funds is
much smaller than that of public financing.
The interrelation between public funding presence and choices of platforms by parties
has been observed empirically by Ko¨ppl-Turyna (2014). Ko¨ppl-Turyna (2014) finds that
for a sample of 45 developed countries, parties tend to locate themselves further away
from the median voter when public financing occurs. A natural explanation for this phe-
nomenon is the “barrier to entry” created by the public financing system. Parties with
past electoral success have access to a substantially higher level of financing and therefore
can remain closer to their ideal points, whereas disadvantaged candidates choose divergent
platforms. In other words, platforms and campaign expenses are substitutes for maxi-
mizing the expected share of votes: when financing is constrained, electoral platforms are
used to compensate. In this work, we analyze this relationship by using a formal model of
elections and test the theoretical predictions in an empirical setting.
Counterevidence comes from Masket and Miller (2015), who analyze Arizona and
Maines “Clean Election” laws, which provide public funding to state legislative candidates.
The authors find no differences in legislative behavior between the candidates funded by
public money compared with private donors.
Theoretical studies of the public funding of parties are rather scarce. Ortun˜o Ortin and
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Schultz (2005) analyze a two-party model in which parties have access to public funding
assigned on the basis of future electoral success. It is shown that a public funding system
increases policy convergence. The effect is larger when more funding depends on vote
shares. If parties have access to other lump-sum amounts of campaign finance, the effect is
moderated. It is important to mention here that these authors analyze a symmetric case.
Troumpounis (2012) compares, using a two-party group turnout model, the extent
to which two types of public funding systems affect parties mobilization efforts and the
equilibrium turnout. By allowing one party to have larger support than the other, the
author uncovers differences in the equilibrium structure: while in the unique equilibrium
of per seat funding systems, both parties exert the same amount of effort, a per vote
funding system results in an asymmetric equilibrium in which the advantaged party exerts
more effort than its opponent.
Finally, the closest theoretical approach to the present one is Ortun˜o Ort´ın and Schultz
(2012), who consider the public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly in-
formed about parties candidates and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria,
it is shown that more public funding leads parties to choose more moderate candidates and
that an increase in the dependence of the funding on vote shares induces further modera-
tion and improves welfare. If parties are asymmetric, vote share-dependent public funding
benefits the large party and makes it moderate its candidate, while the smaller party reacts
by choosing a more extremist candidate. That said, the latter result is derived only as a
numerical simulation.
This work complements previous approaches in several ways. First, the above-cited
works concentrate on the informative aspect of campaigning, whereas we focus on the case
when campaigning has a purely persuasive effect. Second, we directly consider the case of
financial constraints as well as the interrelation of these constraints with other variables
in the model, such as the policys salience. Moreover, albeit with a simpler model than
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the mentioned literature, we derive analytical results in the case of asymmetric equilib-
ria. Finally, we offer testable hypotheses and show their validity through an empirical
investigation.
Our main theoretical results predict that in the presence of asymmetric budget con-
straints, the financially advantaged party converges to the median voter and the disad-
vantaged one diverges away. The strength of the latter effect depends on the salience
of the policy issue in question. Further, we confirm the predicted effect in the empirical
investigation.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the analytical
results. Section III presents the results of the empirical estimation. Section IV concludes.
II. THE THEORETICAL MODEL
1. The structure of the model
The structure of the presented model is derived from the work of Herrera et al. (2008)), yet
with important differences that allow the analysis of how asymmetric budget constraints
affect platforms. Two policy-motivated parties L and R compete in a first-past-the-post
setup. Decisions of the parties involve two components: the choice of a binding policy
platform and choice of campaigning efforts. The ideal points are 0 for party L and 1 for
party R. The platforms l, r ∈ [0, 1] are simultaneously chosen in the first stage and after
observing the policy choices, the campaign efforts L,R ∈ [0, 1] are simultaneously chosen
in the second stage. Strictly speaking, party R, given its ideal point at 1, chooses the
departure from it, 1− r. After the platforms and campaign efforts have been announced,
voting takes place. The parties’ utility functions contain utility from obtaining the office,
denoted B > 0, which includes the gain from winning the election such as perks from office,
as well as disutility from a policy to be implemented after the election if it does not exactly
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correspond to the parties ideal points. We assume that B is a lump-sum benefit, as this
assumption matches the first-past-the-post setup, in which the size of the perks from office
is less dependent on the actual margin of victory than in a proportional representation
system. Specifically, the payoffs functions are
UL =

B − l − L if L wins
−(1− r)− L if R wins
(1)
and
UR =

B − r −R if R wins
−(1− r)−R if L wins.
(2)
The net payoffs include the benefits from office B, the ideological costs r and l, and the
linear cost of campaign activities L and R.
The outcome of the election is determined by the voters, who are uniformly distributed
on a unit interval v ∈ [0, 1]. Voters’ preferences are a function of the policy distance
between their ideal points, an idiosyncratic party bias b and bias towards party L bv. The
voter with ideal point v prefers party L whenever
−a|v − l|+ b+ bv > −a|v − (1− r)|, (3)
and party R if the inequality is reversed. Idiosyncratic bias b is uniformly distributed on
[−β, β], where β will be assumed sufficiently high as not to predict with probability one
the winner of the election. The parameter a ≥ 1 in the utility of the voter measures the
importance of the policy message relative to the idiosyncratic as well as party biases, that
is it reflects the salience of the policy dimension to the voter.
Party bias bv is uniformly distributed on [−α, α], where α is assumed to be low enough,
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that it is impossible to predict the results of the election in advance, that is α + 1 < β.
We model the campaign activity technology similarly to Herrera et al. (2008), yet under
the assumption of perfect targeting, to concentrate on the main effects of interest. This
assumption might seem strict; however, allowing for imperfect targeting does not change
any of the main conclusions and complicates the analytical representation of the results.
Campaign activity linearly increases the probability of winning for each party. For party
L, the final electoral result would equal L · P (L), where P (L) is the proportion of voters
voting for L derived from (3) as explained below.
The most important assumption in our model is that parties can be financially con-
strained. For this, we introduce parameters ΘL and ΘR, which are the financial constraints
of parties L and R, respectively. That is, in any equilibrium,
L ≤ ΘL
R ≤ ΘR
hold, and we assume without loss of generality that ΘL > ΘR.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The parties simultaneously choose positions l and r.
2. The parties simultaneously choose level of spending L and R given their respective
budget constraints.
3. Nature draws bv and b.
4. Voting takes place.
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From (3) it follows that the probability that voter v favors party L equals2
P (v favors L) =

P1(L) =
a+b−al−ar+β
2β
if v ∈ [0, l]
P2(L) = −avβ + a+b+al−ar+β2β if v ∈ (l, 1− r]
P3(L) =
−a+b+al+ar+β
2β
if v ∈ (1− r, 1].
(4)
Overall, the proportion of voters in favor of L equals
P (L) =
l∫
0
P1dv +
1−r∫
l
P2dv +
1∫
1−r
P3dv =
(b− a(l − r)(−1 + l + r) + β)
2β
. (5)
Given linear campaigning technology, the overall probability that L wins the election
is given by
L× P (L) > R× (1− P (L)) (6)
where L,R ∈ [0, 1], or equivalently that
b > a(l − r)(−1 + l + r) + (−L+R)β
L+R
. (7)
By denoting by Fb the distribution of b, the expression above equals
1− Fb(bˆ) = 1−
a(l − r)(−1 + l + r) + α + (−L+R)β
L+R
2α
. (8)
In the second stage, the parties simultaneously choose their levels of campaign activities.
2Assuming, without loss of generality, that l < 1− r - indexes can be reversed.
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Given (1), (2) and (8), the expected payoffs of parties L and R are
piL =[1− Fb(bˆ)](B − l) + Fb(bˆ)(−(1− r))− L (9a)
piR =Fb(bˆ)(B − r) + [1− Fb(bˆ)](−(1− l))−R. (9b)
The corresponding Lagrange functions are
LL = piL − λ1(L−ΘL) (10a)
LR = piR − λ2(R−ΘR), (10b)
and the corresponding Kuhn–Tucker conditions are
∂LL
∂L
= 0
∂LR
∂R
= 0 (11a)
∂LL
∂λ1
≤ 0 ∂LR
∂λ2
≤ 0 (11b)
λ1(L−ΘL) = 0 λ2(R−ΘR) = 0 (11c)
λ1 ≥ 0 λ2 ≥ 0. (11d)
2. Theoretical predictions
2.1. Case 1: Unconstrained solution: L∗ < ΘL and R∗ < ΘR
The unconstrained solution of Herrera et al. (2008) serves as a benchmark for the subse-
quent results. In this case, the optimal expenditure level is below the financial constraint
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for both parties (i.e., neither constraint is binding). In this case, we have
L∗ = R∗ =
β(1− l − r +B)
4α
and λ1 = λ2 = 0. If 1− l− r+B ≤ 0 the expenditure of both parties in equilibrium equals
zero.. We do not analyze this case any further. Hereafter, we assume, therefore from now
on that 1− l− r+B > 0 to avoid dealing with uninteresting corner solutions. Otherwise,
the levels of expenditure are given by L∗ and R∗, the first-stage first-order conditions are
symmetric and the platforms chosen in equilibrium are
p∗uncons = l
∗
uncons = r
∗
uncons =
1
4
(
2 +B −
√
a (aB2 + 4α− 2β)
a
,
)
(12)
which is in essence a replication of Herrera et al. (2008), if we redefine β¯ = β/a and
α¯ = α/a. In this case, we have
∂p∗uncons
∂B
> 0
and
∂p∗uncons
∂a
Q 0,
dependent on the relation between α and β; that is if 2α − β > 0, then ∂p∗uncons/∂a > 0.
We conclude that the relation between the platforms of parties in equilibrium and the
importance of policy compared with the stochastic components depends on the strength
of the latter. If α + 1 < β < 2α, that is the idiosyncratic bias is not too large, the parties
converge to the median along with increasing a, and the opposite holds if the condition is
not satisfied. This result is intuitive: when the policy dimension is important to voters, the
parties gain support through a movement in the direction of the median voter. If the voters
are easily impressionable (i.e., is a is low), parties prefer to invest in campaigning efforts
and simultaneously bear a lower policy cost. Polarization, defined as 1−r− l, is decreasing
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in the benefit from holding office and the effect of policy importance is ambiguous, as
explained above.
2.2. Case 2: Constrained solution: L∗ = ΘL and R∗ = ΘR
This subsection describes the main results to shed light on how asymmetric budget con-
straints affect platform choices. In this case, we have
λ1 = −1 + (1− l +B − r)βΘR
α(ΘL + ΘR)2
(13a)
λ2 = −1 + (1− l +B − r)βΘL
α(ΘL + ΘL)2
, (13b)
and the dual feasibility conditions place additional constraints on the parameter values.
λ2 > λ1 because ΘL > ΘR, and the necessary condition for the solution to be dually feasible
is
ΘR ≤ β(1− l − r +B)
4α
.
The first-stage solutions to the constrained problem are
l∗cons =
1
2
+
B
4
−
√
a (aB2 + 4α) (2β(ΘL −ΘR) + (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR))
4a (aB2 + 4α) (ΘL + ΘR)
(14a)
r∗cons = l
∗
cons +
β(ΘL −ΘR)√
a (aB2 + 4α)(ΘL + ΘR)
. (14b)
Proposition 1. The platform of party L is strictly closer to its ideal point than the platform
of party R iff ΘL −ΘR > 0.
Proof. A brief inspection of (14a) reveals that r∗cons > l
∗
cons iff ΘL −ΘR > 0.
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Replacing l and r in the expressions of the Lagrange multipliers yields
λ1 =
√
a (aB2 + 4α)βΘR + a (BβΘR − 2α(ΘL + ΘR)2)
2aα(ΘL + ΘR)2
(15a)
λ2 =
√
a (aB2 + 4α)βΘL + a (BβΘL − 2α(ΘL + ΘR)2)
2aα(ΘL + ΘR)2
, (15b)
A sufficient condition for a solution in which both parties are constrained to be feasible is
B ≥ −β
2ΘL
2 + aα(ΘL + ΘR)
4
aβΘL(ΘL + ΘR)2
.
Thus, either the benefits from holding office are high enough or policy importance is low
enough. In this case, we have
∂l∗cons
∂a
=
aB2(β(ΘL −ΘR) + α(ΘL + ΘR)) + 2α(β(ΘL −ΘR) + 2α(ΘL + ΘR))
2 (a (aB2 + 4α))3/2 (ΘL + ΘR)
> 0
∂r∗cons
∂a
=
aB2(β(−ΘL + ΘR) + α(ΘL + ΘR)) + 2α(β(−ΘL + ΘR) + 2α(ΘL + ΘR))
2 (a (aB2 + 4α))3/2 (ΘL + ΘR).
The sign of the latter derivative depends on the parameters of the model; it can be
shown that as long as
α >
β(ΘL −ΘR)
ΘL + ΘR
,
r∗cons is increasing in a
3. Therefore, similar to the unconstrained case, the effect of pol-
icy importance depends on the magnitude of the stochastic components of voters’ utility
functions.
Unlike in the symmetric case, however, the advantaged party always converges to the
median voter as policy importance rises. The disadvantaged opponent converges to the
median along with a only if α is high comparative to the difference in budgets. If ΘL−ΘR
3For space-saving purposes some derivations are not presented but can be obtained upon request.
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is high, this condition is more difficult to satisfy: for a high difference in budgets, the
disadvantaged party is likely to diverge from the median voter even if policy importance
is high. The latter observation, which is the main result of the theoretical discussion, is
tested by using an empirical investigation in the next section.
Additionally, the behavior of second derivatives reveals how the financial advantage of
one party interacts with parameter a describing policy importance for voters. In other
words, the following hold:
∂2l∗cons
∂a∂ΘL
> 0
and
∂2r∗cons
∂a∂ΘL
< 0.
In other words, holding ΘR constant, the movement of platform l toward the median caused
by the financial advantage is stronger for high values of a and the effect is opposite for
platform r.
III. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
1. Testable hypotheses
The first hypothesis that stems from the literature and theoretical model regards the re-
lationship between issue salience and divergence of platforms from the median voter. In
this discussion, it is important to distinguish between the issues that are salient to only
certain parties and those important to voters. Extreme parties are expected to attach
great importance to only certain groups of issues (e.g. green parties often propose extreme
environmental policies and far-right parties proclaim radical stances on immigration is-
sues). There often exists a one-to-one correspondence between policy extremism and the
importance of a particular policy dimension to an individual party. On the other hand,
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for dimensions of high importance to the general population, less extreme positions are
expected, as the importance of median, ”non-partisan” constituencies is of high relevance
for electoral success.
Hypothesis 1. Controlling for the importance of dimensions to individual parties and
campaign financing regulations, we expect more platform convergence for the dimensions
that appear more salient to voters.
The second hypothesis stems from the asymmetric behavior of parties. Our theoretical
model (which confirms the numerical simulations of Ortun˜o Ort´ın and Schultz (2012) for
the case of informative campaigning) states that the financially advantaged party converges
to the median voter, whereas the disadvantaged one is likely to diverge away. The higher
the difference in budgets, the more likely it is that the disadvantaged party diverges away.
Since, as mentioned in the Introduction, most party funding is allocated on the basis of
electoral support, and since we do not have access to reliable data on the actual budgets of
parties, we link electoral support to access to more financial means when public financing
is present.
Hypothesis 2. Direct public funding is associated with a position closer to the median
voter for parties with high support and further from the median voter for parties with low
support.
Finally, the third hypothesis stems from the relationship between the behavior of the
advantaged and disadvantaged parties and issue salience. As shown above, the effect
identified in Hypothesis 2 should be stronger if policy salience is high.
Hypothesis 3. The movement of the platform of a party with high support toward the
median is stronger for high policy salience and the effect is opposite for the platform of a
disadvantaged party.
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2. Data and Methodology
The data on platforms used in this study come from the work by Benoit and Laver (2006)
based on expert assessment of platforms. The dataset used herein comprises platform
estimates of 354 parties in 45 countries across 36 policy dimensions for a particular election
year between 2000 and 20044 for a total of 2916 observations. The data are scaled on
a 120 scale. The interpretation of particular values depends on the policy dimension.
For example, low values on the Tax/Spending scale describe a socialist/social-democratic
party, while low values in the Religion dimension correspond to conservative/Christian
values. Certain policy dimensions are only present in certain countries (e.g. Quebecs
independence from Canada). The data therefore form an unbalanced panel spanning policy
dimensions and countries. The dependent variable in all regressions is the policy distance
of an individual party from the median voter, which is the absolute difference between the
experts estimate of the platform and 10.55 according to the formula:
Distancei,j,k = |Platformi,j,k − 10|, (16)
for party i in country j across dimension k.
The data additionally comprise information on the importance of a particular policy
dimension to the party, on a 020 scale. As noted in the Introduction, one needs to distin-
guish between the issues perceived as salient by parties and those of interest to voters. As
the sample does not comprise information on the importance of issues to voters, we proxy
for the general importance of an issue by using the average importance of a dimension
across all the parties in a particular country. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for
the most interesting dimensions across countries.
4A full list of countries can be found in the Appendix
5The number 10.5 lies exactly in the middle between 1 and 20.
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Table 1: Average importance of the policy dimensions across countries.
Dimensiona Mean Std. Dev
Taxes v. Spending 12.42 1.47
Social Issues 11.53 2.32
Privatization† 13.32 1.30
EU Joining† 14.91 1.41
Environment 10.36 2.09
Former Communists† 11.49 1.91
Religion† 11.67 1.71
Urban/Rural Development† 11.08 1.41
Immigration 13.02 2.07
Security (Israel only) 15.98 0
Quebec (Canada only) 13.57 0
Relations with West (Russia only) 13.34 0
a† denotes that the dimension is present in the particular subsample only.
To further analyze the relation between issue salience and party position, we present the
same set of regressions using different data on the importance of policy dimensions. In the
second set of regressions, we employ data from the Manifesto Project Database (Volkens
et al., 2014). For each party and policy category, these data contain the number of instances
certain aspects of policy were mentioned in the parties manifestos. This number of instances
serves as the individual salience variable (ImpManifesto); this number averaged over all
parties in a country is similar to the case of average salience above (AvImpManifesto).
The data are split into six categories of policies as well as subcategories reflecting diverse
policy aspects. These categories, however, do not fully correspond to the coded policy
dimensions of Benoit and Laver (2006) and do not contain all the policy dimensions in the
main dataset used in this work. We match the categories present in the Manifesto database
with the policy dimensions of Benoit and Laver (2006) (see Table 7 in the Appendix). Since
not all categories are represented in the Manifesto data, the sample is necessarily smaller in
this case, comprising 984 observations. This set of regressions serves mainly as a robustness
check for the main regressions.
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We perform panel estimations under diverse assumptions about the error structure.
We allow for unobserved country effects and unobserved dimension effects. We present the
results of the pooled OLS and twoway FE estimates.
An important issue worth considering (refer to Ko¨ppl-Turyna (2014) for further details)
is the potential endogeneity of certain institutions with respect to the level of corruption
and general governance of a country. Table 2presents the correlations between the analyzed
institutions using two measures estimated by the World Bank: quality of the state and
its independence from political pressure (Kaufmann et al., 2010). This table suggests
that whereas the existence of the public funding of parties seems unrelated to the level of
corruption, limits on contributions are implemented precisely in those countries in which
the general level of governance is low, possibly to mitigate the influence of special interests
on policies. A state legislative authority is likely to adopt strict rules to decrease the
influence of special interest groups on platforms. If the legislator implements campaign
finance institutions on the basis of divergence in platforms, they will be endogenous in
the model. In this case, not correcting for the endogeneity of this institution will yield
underestimated coefficients. As the influence of special interests can be an important factor
in explaining the dependent variable in our estimations, we perform 2SLS regressions, in
which we instrument for the limits on contributions by using exogenous measures found in
the literature to be strongly related to corruption levels: urbanization rate and education
level measured by tertiary education enrollment. The correlations of the instruments with
the indices of governance quality are reported in Table 8 in the Appendix.
To test Hypothesis 1, the variables Importance and AvImportance are of main interest
in the regressions. The first is of individual importance to a party, while the second serves
as the average across all parties for a particular dimension. In accordance with Hypothesis
1, we expect a negative coefficient for the AvImportance variable, suggesting a movement
toward the median voter along with high salience.
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Table 2: Campaign finance institutions and the quality of governance.
Questions GEa CCbc
Is there a limit on individual contributions? -0.5185 -0.5158
Do parties receive direct public funding? 0.0585 0.0798
aGovernment Effectiveness – capturing the perception of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures.
bControl of Corruption – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, as well
as the ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
cFor both indicators a higher value denotes a higher quality of governance.
To test Hypothesis 2, we add the interaction of the direct public funding dummy with
the vote share of the party obtained in the preceding election. Finally, to test Hypothesis
3, we examine the behavior of the triple interaction between the public funding dummy,
electoral support and policy importance.
We control for additional variables that may affect policy polarization: the effective
number of parties (see Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), the proportionality of the electoral
system measured by using Gallagher index of proportionality (Gallagher, 1991), ethnolin-
guistic fragmentation, as defined in Desmet et al. (2009), and a dummy for post-communist
democracies.
3. Results
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation for the full sample without the interaction
terms. The reported weak identification tests are derived from Kleibergen (2002) and
Paap (2006), while the overidentifying restrictions Hansen J statistics are obtained with
Schaffer and Stillman (2010); both tests yield consistent statistics with robust standard
errors. Regarding Hypothesis 1, Table 3 confirms that for issues of higher importance, all
parties tend to locate closer to the center of the policy line. Whereas the importance of an
issue to an individual party correlates with more extreme positions, average importance
is negatively associated with the distance between the center of the policy line and the
position of each party. The effect is highly significant in all specifications.
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Table 3: Full sample results without the interaction terms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS FE Pooled IV FE IV
Importance 0.48∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(18.81) (18.82) (18.49) (18.55)
AvImportance -0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
(-4.51) (-4.14) (-3.98) (-4.07)
Limits on Cont. -0.11 -0.28 -0.29∗∗ -0.39∗∗
(-0.86) (-1.13) (-2.44) (-2.05)
Public Funding 0.84∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
(4.12) (2.65) (4.12) (3.06)
ENP -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.02
(-1.30) (-0.85) (-1.37) (0.36)
Proportionality -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.87) (-0.38) (-1.64) (-1.19)
Ethnolinguistic Frag. 0.73∗ 0.98 0.65∗ 1.14∗
(1.79) (1.46) (1.84) (1.76)
Post Comm. -0.00 -0.15 0.06 -0.16
(-0.00) (-0.63) (0.40) (-0.76)
Constant -0.86 -0.87 -0.97 -1.58∗∗
(-1.67) (-1.38) (-1.66) (-2.48)
Dimension Effects NO YES NO YES
Country Effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 2916 2916 2699 2699
(Pseudo) R2 0.335 0.344 0.435 0.434
K-P Wald - - 246.944 246.944
Hansen J - - 0.284 0.284
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Table 4: Direct public funding and the vote share of the party.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS FE Pooled IV FE IV
Importance 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(18.36) (18.28) (17.89) (17.87)
AvImportance -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(-4.50) (-4.36) (-4.08) (-4.06)
Limits on Cont. -0.09 -0.22 -0.01 0.19
(-0.84) (-1.00) (-0.11) (1.10)
Vote share last election 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.60) (0.27) (0.59) (0.39)
Public Funding 1.30∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(3.79) (3.00) (3.63) (3.11)
Public Funding × Vote share last election -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(-3.86) (-2.84) (-3.61) (-2.74)
ENP -0.06∗ -0.00 -0.05∗ 0.06
(-1.72) (-0.02) (-1.70) (0.83)
Proportionality -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.96) (-0.41) (-1.39) (-1.04)
Ethnolinguistic Frag. 0.60∗ 0.74 0.71∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(1.72) (1.50) (2.17) (2.75)
Post Comm. -0.07 -0.44∗∗ -0.11 -0.51∗∗
(-0.58) (-2.25) (-0.76) (-2.53)
Constant -0.82 -1.61∗ -0.98 -2.47∗∗
(-1.41) (-1.73) (-1.59) (-2.64)
Dimension Effects NO YES NO YES
Country Effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 2916 2916 2699 2699
(Pseudo) R2 0.358 0.454 0.368 0.462
K-P Wald - - 11.756 11.756
Hansen J - - 0.150 0.150
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
Hypothesis 2 finds confirmation in Table 4 and Figure 1. The coefficient of the interac-
tion term between public funding and the vote share in the last election has the expected
negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. Whereas public funding overall is asso-
ciated with platforms further away from the median voter, the effect becomes weaker as
support increases. Figure 1 visualizes this effect: smaller parties locate further away from
the median position as a result of access to public funding, whereas above a threshold
of about 35% support, the effect turns negative and parties locate closer to the median
if public funding is present. This finding confirms that public funding is associated with
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the prevalence of large, successful parties closer to the median position, thereby pushing
smaller competitors further away compared with the cases where no public funding is given
to parties. It is however apparent from Figure 1 that only few observations are available
above the predicted level.
Figure 1: Marginal effects of public funding conditional on the vote share
Table 5 and Figure 26 present the empirical investigation of Hypothesis 3. The co-
efficients have the expected signs but they are not significant at any conventional level.
Nevertheless, as Figure 2 suggests, the effects work at least in the direction predicted by
the model, although the effect is very weak. By comparing the positions of the yellow
curve (corresponding to the 90th percentile of the salience distribution) with the blue one
6For the sake of better readability, the confidence intervals have been suppressed.
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Table 5: Direct public funding and salience conditional on the vote share of the party.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS FE Pooled IV FE IV
Vote share last election 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
(1.20) (1.32) (1.25) (1.46)
Public Funding 2.65∗∗ 2.70∗∗ 2.41∗ 2.73∗∗
(2.12) (2.15) (1.89) (2.21)
Public Funding × Vote share last election -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04
(-0.44) (-0.91) (-0.25) (-0.78)
AvImportance 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Vote share last election × AvImportance -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(-1.02) (-1.24) (-1.07) (-1.32)
Public Funding × AvImportance -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11
(-1.00) (-1.21) (-0.87) (-1.18)
Public Funding × Vote share last election × AvImportance -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(-0.24) (0.25) (-0.38) (0.12)
Importance 0.49∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(18.50) (18.36) (18.03) (17.94)
ENP -0.06∗ 0.00 -0.06∗ 0.06
(-1.93) (0.03) (-1.97) (0.93)
Proportionality -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.98) (-0.52) (-1.44) (-1.17)
Ethnolinguistic Frag. 0.65∗ 0.80 0.76∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(1.96) (1.61) (2.51) (2.97)
Post Comm. -0.06 -0.42∗∗ -0.09 -0.50∗∗
(-0.50) (-2.15) (-0.68) (-2.45)
Limits on Cont. -0.10 -0.25 -0.03 0.17
(-0.92) (-1.07) (-0.27) (0.98)
Constant -2.82∗∗ -3.19∗∗∗ -2.95∗∗ -4.12∗∗∗
(-2.22) (-2.93) (-2.29) (-3.77)
Dimension Effects NO YES NO YES
Country Effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 2916 2916 2699 2699
(Pseudo) R2 0.358 0.454 0.368 0.462
K-P Wald - - 11.756 11.756
Hansen J - - 0.150 0.150
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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(corresponding to the 10th percentile) we find that the effect of public funding pushing
away from the median of low-support parties is weaker for issues of high importance.
Figure 2: Marginal effects of public funding conditional on the vote share at difference levels of salience.
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4. Robustness
As a robustness check, we re-estimate all the equations by using an alternative dataset,
as explained above. Tables 9, 10 and 11 in the Appendix present the estimation results.
Whereas the evidence for Hypothesis 1 is slightly weakened, that for Hypothesis 2 remains
highly significant. Interestingly, Hypothesis 3 also finds confirmation with the alternative
estimation: the coefficients have the expected sign and turn significant at 5% level (they,
however, lose significance once controlling for country-level and dimension effects).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Recent empirical evidence has shown that the public funding of parties might be associated
with them locating further away from the median voter. In this work, we presented a model
of elections in which parties are financially constrained. The main results show that when
a party faces a tight financial constraint, the platform chosen in equilibrium is further away
from its ideal point compared with when campaign expenses are unlimited. Moreover, we
show that the platform of a party facing a tighter financial constraint is further away from
its ideal point than that of its opponent. These results show the theoretical foundations for
the empirical observations made about the impact of the public funding of parties on their
platforms. Additionally, we show that the effect of public funding might be nonlinear in
that it affects parties with high budgets differently from financially constrained opponents.
Moreover, in the empirical section of this paper, we show that the predicted effects find
confirmation in data. We find evidence that smaller parties locate further away from the
median position as a result of access to public funding, whereas above a threshold of about
35% support, the effect turns negative and parties locate closer to the median if public
funding is present.
Our results contribute to the discussion on the extent to which party-financing in-
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struments affect the development of policies. Whereas most of the discussion revolves
around limits to contributions to political parties, our results suggest that public funding
is associated with potentially distorting effects, too. Hence, by creating unequal finan-
cial constraints, public funding not only causes the unequal distribution of funds but also
changes the policy choices of disadvantaged parties.
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Table 6: A list of countries in the sample
Albania Greece Norway
Australia Hungary Poland
Austria Iceland Portugal
Belgium Ireland Romania
Bosnia Israel Russia
Bulgaria Italy Serbia
Canada Japan Slovakia
Croatia Latvia Slovenia
Cyprus Lithuania Spain
Czech Republic Luxembourg Sweden
Denmark Macedonia Switzerland
Estonia Malta Turkey
Finland Moldova Ukraine
France Netherlands United Kingdom
Germany New Zealand United States
Table 7: Manifesto / Benoit and Laver data matching
Manifesto data Benoit and Laver data
European Community/Union (per108, per110) EU: Accountability (for EU countries)
European Community/Union (per108, per110) EU Joining (for non–EU countries)
Federalism (per301) Decentralization
Economy (per401, per402, per403) Taxes vs. Spending
Environmental Protection (per501) Environment
National Way of Life (per601, per602) Nationalism
Traditional Morality (per603, per604) Social
Agriculture and Farmers (per703) Urban–Rural
Communist (per3052, per3053) Former Communists
Table 8: Correlations between the instruments and the measures of governance quality
GEa CCb RLc
Urbanization 0.46 0.47 0.41
Education 0.62 0.60 0.57
aGovernment effectiveness
bControl of corruption
cThe rule of law
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Table 9: Full sample results without the interaction terms - Manifesto Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS FE Pooled IV FE IV
Importance 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(6.65) (6.52) (6.58) (6.48)
Limits on Cont. -0.17 -0.07 0.00 -0.00
(-0.92) (-0.40) (0.00) (-0.03)
Public Funding 0.68∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(2.66) (2.69) (2.85) (2.86)
AvImportance -0.08∗ 0.00 -0.07∗ 0.00
(-1.86) (0.06) (-1.75) (0.10)
ENP -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07
(-1.54) (-1.30) (-1.39) (-1.22)
Proportionality -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(-0.13) (0.49) (-0.31) (0.38)
Ethnolinguistic Frag. 0.65 0.37 0.71 0.41
(1.10) (0.69) (1.19) (0.80)
Post Comm. -0.32 -0.46∗∗ -0.34 -0.46∗
(-1.67) (-2.08) (-1.66) (-1.99)
Constant 3.36∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗
(9.13) (5.40) (8.42) (4.92)
Dimension Effects NO YES NO YES
Country Effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 984 984 951 951
(Pseudo) R2 0.057 0.177 0.056 0.182
K-P Wald - - 246.944 246.944
Hansen J - - 0.284 0.284
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Table 10: Full sample results with the interaction between direct public funding and vote share - Manifesto
Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS FE Pooled IV FE IV
Importance 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(6.46) (6.18) (6.39) (6.10)
AvImportance -0.07∗ 0.01 -0.07 0.01
(-1.76) (0.19) (-1.68) (0.16)
Limits on Cont. -0.18 2.63 0.02 0.82∗∗∗
(-1.05) (1.11) (0.14) (3.28)
Vote share last election 0.02 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗∗
(1.20) (4.25) (1.47) (4.31)
Public Funding 1.48∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 2.06
(3.09) (-4.03) (3.17) (1.61)
Public Funding × Vote share last election -0.05∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(-3.37) (-5.76) (-3.43) (-5.64)
ENP -0.12∗∗ 1.31 -0.12∗ 0.31
(-2.20) (1.65) (-1.89) (1.19)
Proportionality 0.00 0.10∗ -0.00 0.08∗∗
(0.12) (1.79) (-0.15) (2.43)
Ethnolinguistic Frag. 0.64 -16.97∗∗ 0.74 -1.70
(1.05) (-2.48) (1.20) (-0.25)
Post Comm. -0.30 -4.08 -0.32 -1.30∗∗∗
(-1.57) (-1.53) (-1.56) (-8.13)
Constant 3.19∗∗∗ 1.11 2.96∗∗∗ -0.21
(5.91) (0.45) (5.42) (-0.22)
Dimension Effects NO YES NO YES
Country Effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 984 984 951 951
(Pseudo) R2 0.173 0.234 0.060 0.185
K-P Wald - - 10.220 10.220
Hansen J - - 0.130 0.130
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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Table 11: Direct public funding and salience conditional on the vote share of the party - Manifesto Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS FE Pooled IV FE IV
Vote share last election 0.07∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(4.80) (5.32) (4.78) (5.44)
Public Funding 2.59∗∗∗ -0.41 2.71∗∗∗ 2.42
(5.42) (-1.24) (5.54) (1.63)
Public Funding × Vote share last election -0.10∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(-5.57) (-6.49) (-5.38) (-6.50)
AvImportance 0.24∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(5.71) (2.07) (5.96) (2.06)
Vote share last election × AvImportance -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗∗∗ -0.01
(-3.21) (-1.55) (-3.26) (-1.55)
Public Funding × AvImportance -0.30∗∗∗ -0.13∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.14∗
(-5.03) (-1.73) (-5.12) (-1.84)
Public Funding × Vote share last election × AvImportance 0.02∗∗ 0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
(2.65) (1.16) (2.80) (1.27)
Importance 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(5.98) (5.85) (6.00) (5.84)
ENP -0.14∗∗ 1.36 -0.13∗∗ 0.33
(-2.69) (1.51) (-2.27) (1.12)
Proportionality 0.00 0.10 -0.00 0.08∗∗
(0.04) (1.63) (-0.23) (2.19)
Ethnolinguistic Frag. 0.75 -17.20∗∗ 0.86 -1.94
(1.38) (-2.23) (1.57) (-0.26)
Post Comm. -0.27 -4.26 -0.29 -1.35∗∗∗
(-1.47) (-1.42) (-1.46) (-7.83)
Limits on Cont. -0.16 2.75 0.03 0.83∗∗∗
(-0.95) (1.04) (0.22) (2.93)
Constant 2.08∗∗∗ 0.57 1.83∗∗∗ -0.58
(3.91) (0.21) (3.41) (-0.53)
Dimension Effects NO YES NO YES
Country Effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 984 984 951 951
(Pseudo) R2 0.173 0.234 0.060 0.185
K-P Wald - - 10.220 10.220
Hansen J - - 0.130 0.130
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. Significance: * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01
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